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Introduction
Africa most likely accounts for a lion’s share of defunct federations. In the 
wake of independence from colonial powers, and possibly driven by the euphoria 
of Pan-Africanism, a number of independent states in Africa established federa-
tions with their neighbours. In 1959, Senegal and Sudan (present day Mali), two 
former-French colonies, joined to create the Mali Federation. Th e federations of 
Rhodesian (including what are now Zambia and Malawi) and Nyasaland (what 
is now known as Malawi) was established in 1953. Libya and Egypt joined Syria 
to establish the Federation of Arab Republics in 1972. Eritrea joined Ethiopia in 
a United Nations’ sponsored federation in 1952. Th e Federal Republic of Cam-
eroon was established in 1961, bringing together French and British Cameroon, 
which used to be under a single German colonial administration before the First 
World War.
As the opening sentence of this article suggests, the history of federalism in 
Africa is not encouraging. Federalism in Africa was, to put it mildly, an ill-fated 
experiment. Th e Mali Federation collapsed before its second anniversary. Th e 
Federation of Arab Republics was barely into its fi fth year when it was abolished 
in 1977. Th e Federation of Rhodesian lasted from 1953-1963. Th e story of other 
federations on the continent is no diff erent. As Osaghae notes, “federalism has 
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failed to thrive and take fi rm roots in Africa and, on balance, does not appear to have 
dramatic positive eff ects in countries that have tried the federal solution”.1
Recent developments indicate that the federal idea that was never given a 
chance to develop and was ‘being strangled at birth’ is now re-entering the politi-
cal and constitutional scene of several African countries. Th is short article aims 
at providing a preliminary balance sheet of the records of federalism from one 
particular angle, namely the management of ethnic diversity. It examines how 
African federations have responded to the ethnic diversity that characterizes their 
societies. In particular, it looks at how the territorial autonomy solution provided 
by these federations has helped to manage fault lines.
Th e article commences with the discussion of the brief historical narration of 
African federations and their attempts to deal with the anxieties of ethnic groups 
that were concerned about their status in post-colonial Africa. It then analyses 
the nature of politicized ethnicity in Africa and its demands on the (re)structur-
ing of the state. Th e focus then shifts to the current federations that, in one way 
or another, deal with the management of ethnic diversity and examines how the 
territorial autonomy solution, implicit in these federations, have helped to deal 
with the challenges of ethnic diversity.
Federalism and ethnic diversity in post-colonial Africa: Detour through 
history
Not all federations established in Africa had as their objective the accommo-
dation of ethnic diversity. Federations were established for many reasons. In fact, 
some of the federations that were established in the early days of post-colonial 
Africa were simply the creations of colonial powers or their extensions. Th e Fed-
eration of Rhodesian was partly established to perpetuate white hegemony. As 
King (47) notes “[t]he character of the new federation of Rhodesian and Nyasaland 
was determined by the presence of (at their peak) three thousand white settlers, over 
three quarters of whom were in Southern Rhodesian, who ruled over seven million 
black Africans.”2 Similarly, some of the federations in Africa were created as the 
result of the decision of colonial powers to use federalism as “a formula for the 
unifi cation of territorial units of separate antecedents.”3 A prime example is Nigeria, 
which was established as a result of the decision to bring together, in 1914, “the 
1. Eghosa Osaghae, “Federalism and the management of diversity in Africa,” in: Identity, culture and politics, 
vol. 5 Nos. 1&2 (2004): 162-178, 171.
2. Tony King, “Partnership and paternalism: Th e federation of Rhodesian and Nyasaland (1953-1963),” in: 
Defunct federalisms: Critical perspectives on federal failure, eds. Kavalski, Emilian and Zolkos Magdalena (Hamp-
shire: Ashgate, 2008), 47-59.
3. Crawford Young, “Ethnic diversity and public policy: An overview,” in Ethnic diversity and public policy: 
A comparative enquiry, ed. Young Crawford (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan Press, in association with 
UNRISD, 1998), 10.
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two contiguous British protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria”. Eventually 
this led to the establishment of a three-region federal system in 1954.4 In other 
cases, the decision to federate was mainly motivated by the desire to benefi t from 
a large state. Administrative convenience and effi  ciency were also some of the 
reasons behind the establishment of federations.
Yet, a number of federations or semi-federations in Africa were designed to 
respond to the multi-ethnic reality that characterizes many of these post-colonial 
states. Th e option of centralized versus decentralized states dominated the politi-
cal discourse of African states beginning from the early days of independence. 
At the centre of this debate was the tension between the management of eth-
nic diversity and the promotion of national unity. Political leaders considered a 
strong centralized state essential for the purpose of forging national unity. Th is 
was considered by many African governments to be their most pressing task, 
to eff ectively govern the newly born states. Th ey, as a result, turned a blind eye 
to the challenges associated with ethnic diversity. Building the nation was their 
main agenda. “In the heydays of independence, that began in Ghana in 1957”, notes 
Welsh, “accelerating in the 1960s ‘nation building’ was assumed to be the priority of 
all the newly emerging [African] states”.5 Th is was also clear from the public state-
ment of the founding fathers of many of these African states:
Zambia’s President Kaunda said that ‘our aim has been to create genius nations 
from the sprawling artifacts the colonialist carved out’. Cameroons’ President Ahidjo sees 
the institution of the state as a means to achieve nationhood. For him, ‘L’intégration 
nationale c’est l’adaptation des citoyens aux diff érentes structures d’État’. Th e same 
is true of Senghor who writes, ‘Th e state is…primarily a means to achieve the nation’.6
At the centre of the nation-building project is the attempt to achieve a ho-
mogenized society. Th is was so aptly stated by Deng who noted that “[u]nity was 
postulated in a way that assumes a mythical homogeneity amidst diversity.”7 Th e dec-
laration of the post-colonial states as ‘indivisible and unitary’ is the major feature 
of many of the independence constitutions of African states.
Th is attempt at forging a national identity amidst huge diversity was carried 
out in the face of countervailing concern among some ethnic groups who desired 
a system that provides them with some space to manage their own aff airs without 
being vetoed by the dominant group. Th ey were concerned about their political 
4. Rotimi Suberu, “Attractions and contradictions of ethnic federalism: Th e Nigerian experience,” in Ethnic 
federalism: Th e Ethiopian experience in a comparative perspective, ed. David Turton (Athens: Ohio University 
Press, 2006), 65-89.
5. David Welsh, “Ethnicity in sub-saharan Africa,” in: International Aff airs 72 (1996): 477-491, 477.
6. Benyamin Neuberger, “State and nation in African thought,” in: Nationalism, ed. John Hutchinson and 
Anthony Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 233-234, 235.
7. Francis M. Deng “Ethnicity: An African predicament,” Th e Bookings Review 15 (3) (1997): 28-31.
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status in the newly born states and feared or perceived domination by numeri-
cally dominant groups. As a result, they demanded a system that devolves power 
and allows communities to exercise control over their own aff airs without inter-
ference from the dominant group. In Kenya, for example, the small ethnic groups 
feared domination by the Kikyu-Luo alliance, the two largest ethnic groups in 
Kenya.8 Organized under the umbrella of the Kenya African Democratic Par-
ty (KADU), one of the two major political parties in independent Kenya, they 
called for a “Majimbo Constitution”, the Kenyan term for a federalist constitution. 
Th ey pressed for a federal system of government to avoid what they perceived as 
Kikuyu dominance. Similarly, one of the issues that confronted Uganda was the 
status of the Buganda ethnic group, who, based on their proud imperial history 
related to the Baganda Kingdom, demanded for federo, the term Ugandans use to 
refer to subnational autonomy based on the principle of federalism.9 Th e situa-
tion was similar in the DRC, where the federalists insisted on a constitution that 
provided for provincial autonomy.10
Eventually, the debate was resolved predominantly in favour of those that 
championed a centralized unitary state. But this was not without concessions 
that saw the inclusion of the federal idea in some of the independence constitu-
tions. Kenya’s fi rst constitution was imbued with strong elements of ‘Majim-
bo’. Th e country was divided into eight autonomous provinces each with their 
own parliaments that exercise constitutionally assigned powers and functions.11 
Th e independence constitution of the war-torn Democratic Republic of Congo 
was explicitly federalist. It declared that the Republic “is composed of the city of 
Leopoldville and the autonomous provinces.” 12 Th e autonomy of the provinces was 
explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. Another country that adopted an in-
dependent constitution with federal features was Uganda. Th e federal states were 
established to accommodate the Buganda ethnic group. Under the independence 
constitution, Buganda enjoyed a special status while most of the rest of Uganda 
8. Yash Ghai, “Devolution: Restructuring the Kenyan state,” in: Journal of Eastern African Studies, 2:2 (2008): 
211-226.
9. Osaghae, “Federalism and the management of diversity in Africa,”
10. Jeremy Sarkin, 2001 “Towards fi nding a solution for the problems created by the politics of identity in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC): Designing a constitutional framework for peaceful cooperation” 
in: Solomon, Hussein (ed.) “Politics of identity and exclusion in Africa: From violent confrontation to peaceful 
cooperation” available at http://www.kas.de/db_fi les/dokumente/7_dokument_dok_pdf_5094_2.pdf (67-81) 
(accessed on 15 February 2012)
11. H. W. O. Okoth-Ogendo, “Constitutions without constitutionalism: Refl ections on an African political 
paradox,” in Constitutionalism and democracy: Transitions in the contemporary world, ed. D. Greenberg et al (New 
York, OUP, 1993), 65.
12. Article 4 Constitution of the Congo (Leopoldville) of 30 May 1960.
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was governed by the central government under a unitary arrangement.13 Buganda 
was allowed to retain the monarchy. It was administered by a directly elected par-
liament and prime minister. It also maintained its own school system and own 
police force.14 Similarly, the Nigerian federation that was established following 
the amalgamation of colonial areas also adapted to responses to the challenges of 
ethnic diversity.15
As indicated earlier, these important concessions to the federal idea were, with 
the singular exception of Nigeria, short-lived. Th e move towards a centralized 
unitary state did not take long. In Kenya, it was only after one year into the new 
constitution that a decision was made to transform Kenya into a unitary state. 
Th e government refused to implement ‘devolution to provinces’; “[e]lections were 
never held and the provinces were reduced to administrative structure” within a cen-
tralized state.16 Similarly, barely fi ve years passed when the national government 
of Uganda introduced a new constitution that brought an end to the special 
status of Buganda, transforming Uganda into a complete unitary state. Across 
the continent, a political claim based on ethnic identity was particularly regarded 
as an ‘enterprise’ that poses a threat to the fragile nation that the colonial pow-
ers left behind; it was regarded as a recipe for state disintegration. Many went to 
the extent of outlawing or preventing the organization of political parties along 
ethnic lines.
As the detour through the history of federalism in Africa reveals, there was 
considerable clamour for a variant of federal arrangement that would help to 
preserve historical distinctiveness and protect small groups from the hegemony 
of large ethnic groups. As a result, important elements of federalism and subna-
tional autonomy found their way into the independence constitution of several 
countries. However, the political commitment to these constitutional promises 
was glaringly absent. Th e clear consequence was the strangulation of federalism at 
birth in several African states. Large centralized states became the preferred mode 
of governance.
Politicized ethnicity and its implications on the restructuring of the state in 
Africa
However, a half-century of the centralization of power in African countries 
has not delivered political stability. In fact, it has provoked violent responses from 
13. Joel Barkan, “Ethnic fractionalization and the propensity for confl ict in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania,” in 
On the fault line: Managing tensions and divisions within societies, eds. Greg Herbst, Jeff rey, McNamee, Terence 
and Mills (Profi le books: London, 2012), 150-169, 157.
14. Barkan, “Ethnic fractionalization and the propensity for confl ict in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania,” 156.
15. Suberu, “Attractions and contradictions of ethnic federalism: Th e Nigerian experience,”
16. Brakan, “Ethnic fractionalization and the propensity for confl ict in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania,” 162.
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diff erent political movements and groups. Th e proliferation of ethnic based liber-
ation movements in many African states is often attributed to the coerced nation 
building project that employed a highly centralized state as its primary vehicle. 
But the failure of the central government to deliver political stability has not nec-
essarily generated plenteous demand for federalism or subnational autonomy in 
one form or the other. Although ethnicity has and continues to play an important 
role in political mobilization in most African states, subnational autonomy is not 
necessarily the agenda of many of the political formations on the continent. Th is 
is partly because of the particular role that ethnicity has assumed in post-colonial 
Africa, which, to a large extent, dictated the nature of ethnic based claims that 
characterized African states. Th is is about the nature of nation-building projects 
with which most African states have been preoccupied with for the last half-a-
century and the implication it holds for political mobilization.17
At one end of the spectrum are African countries that tried to build a nation 
through the development of common language, culture and history by attempt-
ing to diff use the language and culture of the majority or dominant group. In 
Sudan, the decision to develop the identity of the state along the language and 
culture of the northern Muslim Arab Sudanese and impose that culture on the 
largely black and Christian South is a prototype of such form of nation-build-
ing.18 Th e eff ort to build a nation in Ethiopia was largely characterized by the 
attempt to diff use the language, culture and history of the Amhara over the rest of 
the population.19 In Malawi, the attempt at building a common national identity 
was based on the elevation of the Chewa as the embodiment of the ‘national cul-
ture’ (an ethnic group whose language was considered the sole national language). 
Th e Chewa culture was regarded as “the cornerstone of nationhood and source of 
its political iconography”.20 Similarly, the development of a nation modelled on 
the language and culture of the Tswana was the hallmark of the nation-building 
project that Botswana pursued. Based on the motto that “we are all Tswana”, the 
government sought to build a nation by diff using the language and culture of 
Tswana on the rest of the population. As Werbner notes, the policy “left virtually 
17. For a detailed discussion, see Will Kymlicka, “National–building and minority rights: Comparing Africa 
and the West,” in Ethnicity and democracy in Africaeds. Bruce Berman, Dickson Eyoh and Will Kymlicka (Ath-
ens: Ohio University Press, 2004), 54-72.
18. Anna Rader, “Overcoming the past: War and peace in Sudan and south Sudan,” in multi-case review of the 
world’s most potent faultlines, eds. Herbst, Jeff rey, McNamee, Terence and Mills, Greg (2012), 45-68.
19. Yonatan Fessha, Ethnic diversity and federalism: Constitution making in South Africa and Ethiopia (Surrey: 
Ashgate. 2010).
20. D. Kaspin, “Tribes, regions, and nationalism in democratic Malawi,” in Ethnicity and group rights, eds. 
Shapiro, Ian and Kymlicka, Will (New York and London: New York University Press, 1997), 464-503, 483.
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no space in the public sphere for the country’s many non-Tswana cultures, unless recast 
in a Tswana image”.21
Other African states, however, pursued the same objective of building a na-
tion-state but based on non-ethnic premises. Th ey sought to build a common 
national identity not by attempting to homogenize their population along the 
language and culture of a particular ethnic group but by appealing to non-ethnic 
bases for identifi cation with the state. Based on their motto ‘kill the tribe to 
build the nation’ (Frente da Libertação de Moçambique, Frelimo), they declared a 
commitment to build a “common national identity,… developing common public 
institutions and a common public sphere operating in a common language”,22 which 
was the culturally neutral colonial language (i.e. English, French or Portuguese). 
Th e end result was not substantially diff erent.
Although the language and culture of a particular ethnic group was not used 
as a vehicle to develop a common national identity, the nation-building project 
in many of these African states did not succeed in developing a common national 
identity on a supra-ethnic basis. Many of these African states often ended up cre-
ating a state in which a particular group enjoyed a privileged position vis à vis the 
rest. Th e policy of successive regimes using state resources to advantage members 
of their ethnic group meant that “access to state power is ethnifi ed”.23 In Kenya, the 
hegemony of the Kikuyu was established under Jomo Kenyatta, the fi rst president 
of independent Kenya. When Daniel Arap Moi became president, it was Kalen-
jin’s ‘time to eat.’ Moi ensured that the key cabinet, the civil service and the army 
positions were controlled by Kalenjins, particularly marginalizing the Kikuyus. 
Th e ethnifi cation of the state continued with the return of the Kikuyu hegemony 
when Kenya embarked on a multiparty system while Mwai Kibaki, a Kikyuyu, 
became President.24 Th e dominance of the Chewa in Banda Hasting’s 30 year rule 
of Malawi, the Muslim Arabs in Sudan, the Hutus and the Tutsi in the pre-1994 
Rwanda and Burundi respectively is well documented. Th e political history of 
most African states is drawn from the same book.25
Although both attempts at building a nation have been less than successful 
and ended up creating a state which is identifi ed with a particular ethnic group, 
the grievances they created and the political movements that ensued are not nec-
21. R. Werbner, “Introduction: Challenging minorities, diff erence and tribal citizenship in Botswana” in Jour-
nal of Southern African studies, 28(4) (2002): 676.
22. Kymlicka, “National–building and minority rights: Comparing Africa and the West,”
23. Ibid.
24. For more on ethnicity and Kenya see: Barkan, “Ethnic fractionalization and the propensity for confl ict in 
Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania,”
25. Th e clearest exception might be Tanzania where, in so far as mainland Tanzania is concerned, ethnicity has 
not emerged as a major political divide. As a result, access to state power is not ‘ethnifi ed’ and political mobiliza-
tion does not follow ethnic lines.
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essarily the same. Ethnic groups that are threatened by the fi rst form of nation 
building have engaged in ethnic-based nationalist movements that sought to re-
verse the policy of population homogenization. At the centre of their struggle is a 
claim for the recognition of their language and culture and an attempt to redefi ne 
the identity of the state. In their eff ort to advance their version of nationalism (i.e. 
minority nationalism) and thereby counter the state-led hegemonic nationalism, 
they sought not only a subnational unit in which they are in the majority but also 
a subnational unit that has the power to exercise control over its own resources 
and identity-related matters like language, culture and education. Exercising con-
trol over language policy, curriculum in schools and maintaining monopolies 
over broadcasting agencies “[has] been crucial to nation-building strategies”.26 In 
short, the claim for subnational autonomy is at the centre of their political con-
testations.
Th at is not, however, necessarily the case in many African states that attempt-
ed to build a common national identity on a supra-ethnic/non-ethnic basis but 
nevertheless failed to do so as the nexus of ethnicity and state power remains 
fi rmly entrenched. Here, the claim is not for cultural or political autonomy but 
access to state power. Th ey would demand the removal of hurdles to access state 
power, decrying the status quo in which “some ethnic groups will have much bet-
ter access routes to the state, while other ethnic groups are excluded.”27 Th e following 
observation about the Democratic Republic of Congo captures the political sen-
timents that exist in many of these African states:
“Th e Congolese do not typically complain about their integration in the nation. 
What feeds their grievances is the largely shared impression that their fellow Congolese 
cheat them and favour their kinsmen at the local level, and that they need to rely on 
similar solidarities to reach their own goals of safety and well-being. Th is is what the 
Congolese refer to as tribalism.”28
Federalism, with its emphasis on subnational autonomy, is not necessarily 
appealing for this group of political contenders. Th e institutional response that 
such groups clamour for is a system that ensures representation of the diff erent 
groups at the national level, thereby, guaranteeing a share of state power. Th eir 
major goal is securing a power sharing deal; the focus is primarily on shared rule 
rather than self-rule.
26. Norman Wayne, Negotiating nationalism: Nation-building, federalism and secession in the multinational state 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 10.
27. Kymlicka refers to these groups as communal contenders as opposed to ethnonationalists: Kymlicka, “Na-
tional –building and minority rights: Comparing Africa and the West,”
28. Pierre Englebert “Th e Democratic Republic of Congo: Fault lines and local fi ssures,” in On the fault line: 
managing tensions and divisions within societies, Profi le eds. Jeff rey Herbst, Terence McNamee and Greg Mills 
(books: London 2012), 33-45, 36
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Of course, this is not to suggest that subnational autonomy does not placate 
politically mobilized ethnic groups. Subnational autonomy by defi nition multi-
plies access to political and economic power. By providing ethnic groups a region 
in which they are a majority, it facilitates opportunities for political participation 
and representation. It provides ethnic/regional elites with the means for political 
participation and representation in the leadership structures of their respective 
subnational governments, promoting the self-management of communities. Th e 
conspicuous absence of federalism and subnational autonomy on the agenda of 
many political movements in Africa is thus not necessarily linked to the inability 
of the system to address the concerns of these political communities. It is rather 
the nature of the nation-building project that was advanced by many states in 
Africa that might explain the dampened interest in federalism and territorial au-
tonomy.
A new era of federalism in Africa?
Although not necessarily the case with most African states, the reality of dis-
gruntled ethnic groups and political violence, spilling over, in many cases, into 
intractable armed confl icts, has forced the restructuring of the state and, more 
specifi cally, the introduction of subnational autonomy on the political agenda 
of several African states. Th is is particularly true in states that are characterized 
by ethnic stratifi cation and hierarchy in which a particular group, as a result of 
a nation-building project that sought to impose the language and culture of a 
particular ethnic group over the rest of the population, occupies a unique and 
relatively privileged position vis-à-vis the rest. Many of these states have faced 
and continue to face ethnic groups that wage collective action demanding greater 
autonomy. Many of these African states, albeit begrudgingly, have now adopted 
constitutions that envisage the transfer of power to smaller subnational units.
In fact, history, it seems, is repeating itself. As one author has put it, “as an 
idea that was universally rejected in the 1960s through to the early 1990s across 
Africa”, federalism is now, “an idea whose time has come in several countries”.29 
It is those same states that, in the early days of independence, conceded to the 
inclusion of the federal idea in their constitutions only to quickly abandon it, 
that are now jumping onto the federalist bandwagon. Th ese states do not neces-
sarily recognize themselves as federal states. In fact, a common feature of African 
states deciding to introduce subnational autonomy is the reluctance to explicitly 
recognize that they have adopted some form of federalism. Federalism is regarded 
as the ‘F’ word and it is carefully avoided.
29. Barkan, “Ethnic fractionalization and the propensity for confl ict in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania,” 168.
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Th e use of the term “federalism” to designate the state was a major point of 
contention in the making of the 1996 South African constitution. Th e system of 
government that South Africa has adopted has important elements of federalism. 
With its three levels, or to use the South African term ‘spheres’, of government, 
each with devolved powers and functions exercised and implemented by a di-
rectly elected parliament and executive respectively, and a second chamber that 
brings the provinces into the national decision-making process,30 the inclusion 
of South Africa among the ranks of federations, as contemporary literature on 
federalism does, should not come as any surprise. Despite this, the South Afri-
can constitution and the authorities in that country have deliberately avoided 
the use of the “F” word. Even the new constitution of Kenya is content with 
describing its political system as one of devolution. Th is is despite the fact that 
the constitution provides for the establishment of directly elected subnational 
units, which enjoy some level of autonomy by exercising assigned powers, and 
a second chamber that is representative of its subnational units.31 Similarly, the 
2005 constitution of the Democratic Republic of Congo bears the hallmarks of a 
federation. It provides for the establishment of 25 autonomous provinces that are 
independently elected and whose constitutionally assigned powers can only be 
amended with their consent. More importantly, the provinces, which are brought 
into the national decision-making process through their representation in the 
Senate and the Conference of Governors, have the power to retain 40 percent of 
the tax revenue they generate.32 But nowhere in the Constitution would one fi nd 
the term “federalism”.
Generally, the reluctance to use the term federalism can be partly explained 
by deep misgivings about federalism, more specifi cally by the tainted image and 
history of federalism in many of these countries. In Kenya, the debate on feder-
alism, as indicated earlier, can be traced back to the early days of independence 
when political groups, claiming to represent the smaller ethnic groups in Kenya, 
agitated for “Majboism”. Many Kenyana associate “Majboism” with the division 
of people along tribal lines and the disintegration of the country.33 Opponents 
turned “majimboism into a slur: [and] majimboists were derided as [antinationalist] 
tribalists who opposed the broader goals of nationalism”.34 In South Africa, feder-
alism is associated with the “bantustanisation” of South Africa, a policy of the 
apartheid government that divided the black population along ethnic lines and 
sought to expel them from the physical and political terrain of South Africa and 
30. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996.
31. Constitution of Kenya, 2010
32. Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2005
33. Yash Ghai, “Devolution: Restructuring the Kenyan state,”
34. Okoth-Ogendo, “Constitutions without constitutionalism: Refl ections on an African political paradox,”
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establish white South Africa for white South Africans. Th e same is true with the 
DRC. As one author put it, “[c]onstitutionally, the DRC has had an ambivalent 
relationship with federalism”.35 Th e secessionist movements and the civil war that 
the DRC experienced in the early days of its independence have contributed to 
the controversial history of federalism in that country.
From the foregoing, the position in Africa, it seems, is that states should worry 
little about the designation of the state. As the drafters of the South African 
constitution have done, the focus should be on an appropriate system of consti-
tutional government that provides for “good and eff ective government”36 and not 
on the formal description of the state. In any case, these decisions are attributed 
to the deep suspicion with which federalism is viewed in many of these African 
states; a view that regards federalism as a poor device to manage fault lines and a 
recipe for state disintegration. Th e only country in Africa, with the exception of 
Africa’s longest run federal experiment, Nigeria, that boldly declares itself as a fed-
eral republic, is Ethiopia. Th e opening article of the 1995 Constitution of Ethio-
pia declares the establishment of “Th e Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.”
Despite the reluctance to extend a formal recognition, the use of autono-
mous or semi-autonomous subnational units in a federal or semi-federal frame 
for managing internal confl icts, forms an important part of the institutional re-
sponse that several African states have adopted to deal with the challenges of eth-
nic diversity. Th is involves providing autonomy in the form of subnational units 
(referred to as provinces in South Africa and the DRC, states in Nigeria, counties 
in Kenya and regions in Ethiopia) to a geographically concentrated ethnic group. 
A prime example of this approach is the Ethiopian federation. Th e Ethiopian 
federal experiment, which was launched almost two decades ago, is primarily 
designed to accommodate the country’s ethnic diversity.37 Th is is evident in the 
territorial organization of the Ethiopian federation. Th e federation is divided into 
nine regions that are, by and large, demarcated along linguistic lines. More than 
two thirds of the people that live in fi ve of the nine regions belong to a single eth-
nic group. Each of these states is also designated after the name of the dominant 
ethnic group in each state, marking the explicit construction and designation of 
each regional state as the homelands of a single ethno-linguistic group. With the 
view to accommodate its 250 ethnic groups, Nigeria has also employed the ‘terri-
torial autonomy solution’. Borrowing the words of Elaigwu, “over the years, states 
and local governments were created as a means of minimizing the majority-minority 
35. See Th omas Turner, “Congo-Kinshasa leans towards federalism,” Federations Magazine vol. 7(1) (2007).
36. C. Murray, “Republic of South Africa,” in Legislative, executive and judicial governance in federal countries: 
Global dialogues on federalism, ed. K. Le Roy and C. Saunders (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queens Univer-
sity Press, Vol. 3, 2006), 259-288, 263.
37. For more see: Yonatan Fessha, Ethnic diversity and federalism: Constitution making in South Africa and Ethio-
pia (Surrey: Ashgate. 2010).
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confl icts”.38 During negotiations in the 1990s for a democratic South Africa, both 
conservative Afrikaners and Zulu nationalists pressed for a federal structure in 
the hope that they would gain control of some of the provinces. South Africa’s 
1996 Constitution, with its federal arrangement and nine provinces, has made 
important, albeit implicit, concessions to this objective. Th e same goes for the 
quasi-federal constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Th e increase 
of the number of provinces from eleven to twenty-fi ve is designed to increase the 
“opportunities for the local management of fault lines”.39 Kenya’s new constitution 
provides for a devolved system of government that is based on the establishment 
of forty-seven county level governments.40
Th e lesson from African experience has been that when a state fails to read-
ily acknowledge and accommodate its ethnic diversity, through federalism or 
other such arrangements, this generally leads to increased tensions among ethnic 
groups. Failure to address the concerns of such communities can also lead to a 
devastating result for the territorial integrity of the state. Th e case of Sudan il-
lustrates this very well where a failure to accommodate the claims of disgruntled 
communities eventually resulted in border changes. But the mere adoption of 
federal or similar arrangements does not signify an eff ective accommodation to 
ethnic diversity. Th e success of subnational autonomy arrangements in address-
ing ethnic divisions is not guaranteed. Success depends, among other things, on 
the particular nature of the federal design. Th e question is then whether the fed-
eral design that African states have adopted is appropriate to deal with the exigen-
cies of ethnic diversity.
At the centre of this debate is the territorial defi nition of federal subunits, one 
of the important issues that have emerged with the reintroduction of federalism 
in Africa. Th e focus is on how the territorial design of the federation can be used 
to regulate the challenges of ethnic diversity. More specifi cally, the question is to 
what extent subnational units should ethnically be defi ned. Th is is an important 
variable in designing a federal solution that helps to respond to the challenges of 
ethnic diversity while at the same time avoiding the danger of further entrench-
ing and deepening those same divisions.
Th e territorial defi nition of federal sub-units
In Africa, one federation that has explicitly defi ned its subnational units in 
terms of ethnicity is Ethiopia. Ethnicity is the basis for the organization of the 
38. J. Iswa Elaigwu, “Nigeria: Th e decentralization debate in Nigeria’s federation,” in Th e Federal idea: Essays 
in honour of Ronald L. Watts, ed. Th omas J. Courchene, John R. Allan, Christian Leuprecht and Nadia Verrelli 
(Institute of Intergovernmental Relations: Kingston, Ontario, 2011), 429-444, 440.
39. Pierre Englebert “Th e Democratic Republic of Congo: Fault lines and local fi ssures,” 43
40. Th e Constitution of Kenya, 2010
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Ethiopian federation. Th e use of ethnic based territorial autonomy to address 
ethnic divisions in that country has had a mixed report card. Th e federal experi-
ment has contributed to the extended participation of minorities in the political 
system. Notwithstanding the claim about “true representation or authentic repre-
sentatives” and the dominance of a single party, the system has turned “obscure dis-
tricts” into important units of government with signifi cant local empowerment.41 
In contrast to the selective cooptation of the previous regimes, the federal govern-
ment has also become more diversifi ed than ever in terms of ethnic composition 
as all subnational administrations are occupied by locals.
Th e constitutional decision to provide a mother state to each ethnic group 
and to do so by making ethnic groups dominant in a regional state is not, how-
ever, without its problems. In as much as the federal response has facilitated the 
recognition of ethnic diversity and responded to ethnic claims, it has elevated 
ethnic identity to a primary political identity. Th is has, in turn, facilitated iden-
tity fragmentation along ethno-linguistic lines.42 Th is has been observed, for ex-
ample, in the proliferation of ethnic-based parties or movements. Although one 
may be tempted to dismiss the proliferation of ethnic-based parties as the work 
of the ruling party, there is enough evidence to show that the opposition is also 
fragmented along ethnic lines. Related to the proliferation of ethnic-based par-
ties is the translation of cultural communities into political communities. Ethnic 
identities that, in the past, had a mere cultural status are increasingly turning into 
politically relevant entities. Th is is evident, among other things, in the relentless 
demand for recognition, autonomy and representation by many ethnic groups, 
which is especially visible in some of the ethnically plural regional states where 
ethnic groups of all sizes have demanded some form of recognition and territorial 
autonomy.43 Th e tendency of fragmentation in other socio-economic institutions 
along ethnic lines cannot be easily discounted either.
Th e unremitting demands of ethnic groups of all sizes to be incorporated or 
transferred into one or another regional unit is another indication of the fragmen-
tation of the population along ethno-linguistic lines. Many small ethnic groups 
that have been demarcated into one region have demanded to be incorporated 
into another. Of course, there is nothing unusual in communities demanding 
transfers from one regional state to another. Th e phenomenon of communities 
demanding or even refusing transfers to another subnational unit is not unique 
to Ethiopia. Very recently, residents of some communities in South Africa, for 
example, protested the government’s decisions to transfer their municipalities to 
41. Feyissa Dereje, “Th e experience of Gambella Regional state,” in Ethnic federalism: Th e Ethiopian experience 
in comparative perspective, ed. D. Turton (Athens: Ohio University Press 2006), 208-230.
42. Fessha, Ethnic diversity and federalism: Constitution making in South Africa and Ethiopia.
43. See S. Vaughan, “Responses to ethnic federalism in Ethiopias southern region,” in Ethnic federalism: Th e 
Ethiopian experience in comparative experience ed. D. Turton (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2006) 181-207.
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other provinces.44 Th e diff erence lies in the reasons behind these demands and 
protests. In South Africa, residents of the Matatiele community protested their 
incorporation into the Eastern Cape from KwaZulu-Natal because of the percep-
tion that KwaZulu-Natal off ers better services than the Eastern Cape. In contrast, 
the demand of communities in Ethiopia to be transferred to one or another re-
gional state is not motivated by concerns related to service delivery but by issues 
of identity and belongingness. Members of some communities do not feel that 
they belong to the regional state they have been demarcated into. Th is is another 
consequence of the geographical logic of the federation, which is inherent in the 
decision of the Constitution to explicitly construct and designate regional states 
as belonging to particular ethnic groups, leaving the rest with a feeling of being 
outsiders.
Th e Ethiopian experience seems to suggest that the same approach towards 
the territorial defi nition of subnational units that provides ethnic groups with 
self-management has the potential to strain inter-ethnic relations by reifying 
the political dimension of ethnic identity. It particularly invokes the question 
whether the imperatives of accommodating ethnic diversity requires the state to 
demarcate each, or at least the major, ethnic group into one subnational unit. 
Africa’s longest running federal experiment, Nigeria, seems to provide a diff erent 
alternative in terms of the territorial defi nition of federal subnational units.
As indicated earlier, the Nigerian federation was initially structured along the 
fault lines of the three major ethnic groups. Confronted with the problem of 
providing a mother state to each large ethnic group, Nigeria has continuously 
adjusted its internal boundaries. Initially, the original geographical confi guration 
of the federation was abandoned and replaced with twelve state structures in 
1967. Since then the number of states has increased continuously. Currently, 
the number of states in Nigeria stands at 36. An important component of this 
transformation is that the repeated readjustment of the federation from three to 
the present 36 states involved the use of “the federal structure to fragment, cross-cut 
and sublimate the identities of each of the [three] major ethnic groups”.45 Th e con-
tinuous adjustment of internal boundaries brought about and buttressed historic 
intra-ethnic divides within each of the three large ethnic groups. Although the 
reconfi guration has not totally taken away the use of ethnicity as a basis for po-
litical mobilization in the pursuit of power and resources, it has, by demarcating 
each large ethnic group into a number of states, created intra-ethnic mobilization 
and competition. As a result, “there have been confl icts between otherwise ethni-
cally homogenous major sub-ethnic states over the sharing of the assets of subdivided 
regional or state units, over revenue allocation and over the employment in state-level 
44. Yonatan T. Fessha “SA’s mazy route through the province of ethnicity,” Business Day: (12-06-2007).
45. Suberu, “Attractions and contradictions of ethnic federalism: Th e Nigerian experience,”
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bureaucracies of so-called ‘non-indigenes’—that is Nigerian resident in states other 
than their own”.46
Th e new constitution of Kenya seems to follow a similar approach. Th e 
boundaries of the 47 counties, more or less, mimic the colonial districts that 
were, to a large extent, demarcated along ethnic lines. By way of emphasizing the 
ethnic basis of the counties, one author laments that “[t]he suggested 47 counties 
are not much diff erent from the Masai country [and] Akamba country design un-
der the colonial administration.”47 Th e territorial arrangement does not, however, 
demarcate each large ethnic group into one specifi c county.48 It rather divides 
numerically large ethnic group into a number of counties. Smaller ethnic com-
munities, on the other hand, are given autonomy and greater political voice as 
they control counties in which they are in a majority.
South Africa has accommodated ethnic diversity without even making ethnic-
ity an explicit basis for the organization of the state. South Africa’s nine provinces, 
although not explicitly, contribute to the management of ethnic diversity. Th is 
partly has to do with the fact that the majority of the ethnic groups in South 
Africa have a province in which they are in the majority.49 A clear concentration 
of particular ethnic groups in the majority of these provinces means that most 
ethnic communities are provided with the means for political participation and 
representation in the leadership structure of their respective provinces. Th e fact 
that the Constitution allows each province to choose its offi  cial language(s) fur-
ther facilitates the management of its own aff airs by the provincially dominant 
ethnic groups. Th e decision to accommodate ethnic diversity without explicitly 
articulating the defi nition of the territorial units in ethnic terms seems to have 
helped the country avoid conditions that make ethnicity a single rallying point of 
political competition and cooperation.
Th e foregoing attests to the widely established thesis that emphasizes the in-
terplay between institutional design and political behaviour; that the institutional 
structure of the state and, more specifi cally, in our case, the territorial design 
of the state, goes a long way in determining the salient identities that become 
a basis for political mobilization. Th e experience of African federations suggest 
46. Rotimi T. Suberu,, “Nigeria,” in Diversity and unity in federal countries: Global dialogue on federalism Vol. 7 
eds. Luis Moreno and Cesar Colino (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 2010), 227-
258. 233.
Suberu attributes the success of the Nigerian federation in avoiding large scale ethnic confl icts, that engulfed the 
federation in its early years, to the transformation of Nigeria “from a federation of three major ethnic regions to 
a union of multiple, smaller constituent units,” (Suberu, “Attractions and contradictions of ethnic federalism: 
Th e Nigerian experience,” 228).
47. O. Steve Akoth, “Challenges of nationhood: identities, citizenship and belonging under Kenya’s new consti-
tution,” Society for International Development (SID) Constitution Working Paper (2011): 15.
48. Barkan, “Ethnic fractionalization and the propensity for confl ict in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania,” 169.
49. Fessha, Ethnic diversity and federalism: Constitution making in South Africa and Ethiopia, 113.
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that demarcating each large ethnic group into one specifi c subnational unit can 
radicalize ethnic allegiance, contribute to the ethnicisation of the system, cause 
continuous tension and place a strain on inter-ethnic relations. On the other 
hand, dividing numerically large ethnic groups into a number of constituent 
units without denying them territorial autonomy might have the consequence of 
promoting competitive or cooperative relations that do not reproduce a country’s 
ethnic fault lines.50 In other words, it might contribute to the development of 
“a more ‘civil’ and ‘gentle’ politics” as opposed to the emotionally charged ethnic 
politics that can often spiral into violent confrontation.51
Minorities within minorities
In as much as territorial autonomy, defi ned in exclusive ethnic terms or other-
wise, provides an opportunity to locally manage fault lines, it is not a panacea to 
the multi-ethnic challenge. As the experience of Ethiopia and Nigeria illustrates, 
the territorial structure of federalism might help to avoid large scale ethnic con-
fl icts but the practical impossibility of creating an ethnically pure subnational 
unit brings new tension: the majority-minority tension at the level of the constit-
uent units. Th is is the case, for example, in Ethiopia where the ethnic groups that 
are numerically dominant at the subnational level consider themselves “owners” 
of their respective subnational units. People that do not belong to the regionally 
empowered group “have practically no rights or political voice”.52 Th is is despite 
the fact that these individuals account for a signifi cant segment of the regional 
population. For example, in one of the regions, the number of such individuals 
reaches close to three million.53
Th e Nigerian federation is also strained by a similar challenge. Th e attempt 
to accommodate ethnic diversity through territorial autonomy in the form of 
subnational units has “created new majorities and new minorities at the subnational 
level” in the form of indigenes and non-indigenes. Discrimination against “non-
indigenes” is commonplace in almost all states of Nigeria.54 Despite the provision 
of the Constitution that protects the rights of every Nigerian “to settle down any-
where in the country to pursue their legitimate businesses and [enjoy] equal rights eve-
rywhere”, Elaigwu notes, “[m]any states and communities recognize their indigenous 
50. Suberu, “Attractions and contradictions of ethnic federalism: Th e Nigerian experience,”
51. Barkan, “Ethnic fractionalization and the propensity for confl ict in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania,” 168.
52. Assefa Fiseha and Mohammed Habib, “Ethiopia,” in a global dialogue on federalism, VII. eds Moreno and 
Collino, 2010.
Suberu, “Nigeria,”139-167, 154.
53. Confl icts between regionally empowered group and internal minorities have led to devastating resulting, 
including the loss of life and destruction of property, see: Assefa and Mohammed, “Ethiopia,” in a global dia-
logue on federalism, 2010.
54. Suberu, “Nigeria,” 235.
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groups and can easily isolate settlers, and treat them as such, no matter how long they 
have lived in the area”.55 As is the case in Ethiopia, discrimination against non-
indigenes has created a sense of exclusion amongst the latter, relegating millions 
of individuals to second-class citizens in their own country.56
In both Ethiopia and Nigeria, the exclusionary policies of subnational units 
seem to have their root in federal policies and laws that make belonging to an 
ethnic group or, as in the case of Nigeria, being an indigene to a subnational unit, 
an important political consideration. Th e Ethiopian Constitution, as indicated 
earlier, designates most of the regions as belonging to a specifi c ethnic group, 
creating the feeling of ownership amongst individuals that belong to the region-
ally dominant group and a sense of exclusion amongst those that have ostensibly 
originated from other parts of the country (i.e. internal migrants). Similarly, the 
Nigerian Constitution, based on its constitutional principle of “the federal charac-
ter”, uses the criteria of “indigeness” in providing representation in the institutions 
of the federal government.
Th e experiences of the two federations suggest that a federal arrangement that 
does not accommodate those who do not belong to the empowered regional 
majority is likely to be subjected to perennial stress and is less likely to succeed in 
managing ethnic diversity. Th is particular experience of African federations also 
highlights one of the conditions that continue to threaten the federal experiment 
in Africa, namely the lack of consensus on liberal democratic values. One of the 
reasons for the success of federations in the west is the widespread consensus 
on liberal democratic values. As Kymlicka notes, most western federations are 
not afraid that national minorities will use their power to “persecute, dispossess, 
expel or kill anyone who does not belong to the minority group”.57 In the absence of 
consensus and respect for liberal democratic values, the precarious federal experi-
ments in Africa will continue to pose a grave threat to the fundamental rights of 
individuals and to the political stability of the state.
Th e imperatives of developing consensus and respect for liberal democratic 
values becomes more evident when one notes that the territorial approach to 
subnational autonomy may not necessarily respond to the concerns of all ethnic 
groups. Th is basically relates to the fact that the territorial concentration of ethnic 
groups is a precondition for the extension of subnational autonomy towards a 
particular group. To a group that is not geographically concentrated, the territo-
rial solution that federalism provides is less appealing. Th e territorial arrangement 
in South Africa that, albeit indirectly, gives ethnic groups political space at the 
subnational level, does not cater for Afrikaners who are dispersed throughout the 
55. Elaigwu, “Nigeria: Th e decentralization debate in Nigeria’s federation,” 440.
56. Suberu, “Nigeria,” 235
57. Kymlicka, “National–building and minority rights: Comparing Africa and the West,”
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country. Th is would require the state to look for innovative ways of addressing 
the anxieties of groups that cannot benefi t from a territorial solution. However, 
at a minimum, it requires strict enforcement of liberal values in the form of fun-
damental individual rights.
Th e question of secession
Although the provision of territorial autonomy has gone a long way in manag-
ing the challenges of ethnic diversity and preventing large scale ethnic confl icts, 
a clamour for secession continues to exist in some of these federations. Th is is 
especially true in Ethiopia and Nigeria although the DRC is also not immune 
to secessionist outbursts. In Ethiopia, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), a lib-
eration movement that claims to represent the Oromo (largest ethnic group in 
Ethiopia), continues to engage in armed movement having the establishment of 
an independent state for the Oromo as its major objective. Th e Ogaden National 
Liberation Front (ONLF) is another armed organization that fi ghts to secure the 
establishment of a separate country for the Somali ethnic community, the third 
largest ethnic group in Ethiopia. In Nigeria, political movements that have creat-
ed secessionist projects include the Movement for the Actualization of the Sover-
eign State of Biafra (MASSOB).58 Th e aim of this largely peaceful (non-militant) 
movement is to revive and actualize the attempted secession of the predominantly 
Ibo state of Biafra between 1967-70. Secessionist sentiments are also evident in 
the militant MEND, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, 
which espouses, albeit in a less offi  cial manner, the “creation of an independent 
Ijaw nation-state”. Now and then, the partition of the DRC is also touted as an 
option for the achievement of a meaningful peace in that country. Very recently, 
the government of the DRC has reported that it has foiled a secession plot by 
the mineral-rich Katanga province,59 the same province that attempted to secede 
from the DRC in the 1960s before it was crushed in a bloody civil war.
As argued elsewhere, there is no guarantee that secession will help to achieve 
the desired objective of peace and security. Secession might be regarded as a viable 
means of managing ethnic confl icts when the partition results in two ethnically 
macrocosmic states. Given the impractical reality of creating political boundaries 
that neatly match ethnic boundaries, changes in boundaries, through partition, 
might only transfer the locus of ethnic confl icts and might even give rise to new 
ethnic confl icts. As the experience of the newly born South Sudan indicates, there 
is no guarantee that partition will not “activate and energize new fault lines”.60 
58. Suberu, “Nigeria,”
59. IRIN 2012, DRC: Secession plot failed, government offi  cial says available at
<http://www.irinnews.orgprintreport.aspx?reportid=54392> accessed on 27 February 2012
60. Rader, “Overcoming the past: War and peace in Sudan and south Sudan,” 45
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Secession might also create micro-states that are too small to be regarded as states 
that are economically viable. Add to this the prescription of secession as an in-
stitutional solution which might “give rise to [a] protracted border crisis in coun-
tries like Nigeria, which alone contains more than 250 ethnic groups”.61 Although 
it has not prevented the secession and creation of new states like South Sudan 
and Eritrea, the Organisation of African Unity’s principle of upholding colonial 
boundaries also means that the creation of new states through secession is not an 
option that receives recognition easily. A case in point is the African Union’s snub 
of Somaliland’s quest for formal recognition of its independence after it severed 
its ties from what was once the Somali Democratic Republic (with which it was 
voluntarily united in 1966) and established a promising move towards democ-
racy and rule of law.
It is also important to note that Ethiopia’s constitution is the only one on the 
continent that explicitly recognizes the right to secession. Article 39 of the Con-
stitution provides each ethnic group the right to secede from a federation provid-
ed that it has shown a proven support as required by the Constitution. Certainly, 
as indicated above, enshrining in a constitution the right of a constituent unit to 
secede is fraught with pitfalls. But it must also be acknowledged that sometimes 
there may not be much choice if instability or even civil war is to be avoided. In 
Ethiopia, the political forces at play during the transition from military rule to 
a federal arrangement would not have settled for anything less than entrenching 
the right of secession in the constitution. Not acceding to that demand could well 
have jeopardized a peaceful transition.62
Conclusion
Th e history of federalism in Africa is a history of ambivalence. In the run up to 
independence, numerically small ethnic groups and those with historical distinc-
tiveness saw federalism as a bulwark against the domination of large groups or the 
loss of privileged status. It was an idea that galvanized many political movements 
that, following the retreat of colonial powers, emerged to represent the interest 
of these small and historically distinctive ethnic groups. But it was also an idea 
that was subsequently rejected by those that wield state power and thrown into 
historical dustbins. In the last decade or so, however, we have witnessed the rise 
of federalism from the dustbin of African political history.
Th e increased and renewed interest in federal arrangements that Africa has 
experienced in the last two decades or so, provides for a new opportunity to 
61. Fessha, Ethnic diversity and federalism: Constitution making in South Africa and Ethiopia, 113.
62. Alem Habtu, “Multi-ethnic federalism in Ethiopia: A study of the secession clause in the Constitution,” in 
Publius: Th e Journal of Federalism 35(2) (2005): 313-337.
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engage in innovative federal experiments that could go a long way in address-
ing the concerns of disgruntled ethnic communities. Th is article has shown that 
African states should worry about the territorial defi nition of subnational units. 
Th e same approach of territorial autonomy that helps to manage ethnic fault 
lines might further entrench and exacerbate those same societal divisions it is 
designed to manage. Th e experience of African federations, particularly Nigeria 
and South Africa, suggest that states can respond to the challenges of ethnic di-
versity without institutionalizing ethnic divisions. But equally important to the 
territorial design is the political commitment to the rule of law and fundamental 
human rights. Th e fi rst is crucial in ensuring the realization of the promises of 
federalism while the second helps to avoid political instability and promote social 
cohesion. If constitutional rules are breached at will and the fundamental rights 
of individuals that belong to minorities are violated with impunity, the federal 
experiment is less likely to succeed.
Finally, the process that leads to the launching of a federal experiment is also 
crucial in the success of a federation. One of the major challenges of the Ethiopi-
an federal experiment is legitimacy as the centralists continue to paint the experi-
ment as a recipe for disintegration. Th is perhaps has to do with the fact that there 
is nothing in the federal design that represents a concession to the demands of 
those that were concerned about the threat to national unity. Th e federal design 
“does not provide equal recognition to the competing centripetal and centrifugal forces 
whose struggle for a place in the public spheres continues to defi ne the political realities 
of the Ethiopian state and society”.63 Th is, in fact, is what distinguishes the Ethio-
pian system from the South African institutional response, which is the outcome 
of a negotiated outcome. Th e negotiated nature of the South African constitution 
has led stakeholders and politicians alike to consider the constitution, not only 
as “basic law, or a higher law,” but “our law”. Th e fi nal outcome provides suffi  -
cient recognition to the competing centripetal and centrifugal forces that, at the 
moment of constitution-making, represented the opposing political formations. 
Process is, therefore, equally important in ensuring that the federal design that 
a country chooses mirrors its political realities and is therefore acceptable by the 
major contenders of power.
Abstract
The history of federalism in Africa is a history of ambivalence. In the run up to independence, federalism 
was an idea that galvanized several political movements that, following the retreat of colonial powers, 
emerged to represent the interest of ethnic groups that were anxious about their political status in post 
colonial Africa. But it was also an idea that was subsequently rejected by those that wield state power and 
thrown into historical dustbins. Recent developments indicate that the federal idea that was never given a 
chance to develop and was being strangled at birth is now re-entering the constitutional scene of several 
African countries. This short article examines how African federations have responded to the ethnic di-
63. Fessha, Ethnic diversity and federalism: Constitution making in South Africa and Ethiopia.
EEF 363.indb   284 05/07/12   14:36
Federalism, Territorial Autonomy and the Management of Ethnic Diversity in Africa 285
L’Europe en formation   nº 363  Printemps 2012 - Spring 2012
versity that characterizes their societies. In particular, it examines how the territorial autonomy solution, 
implicit in these federations, have helped to deal with the challenges of ethnic diversity.
Résumé
L’histoire du fédéralisme en Afrique est une histoire d’ambivalence. Dans la course à l’indépendance, 
le fédéralisme fut une idée qui galvanisa de nombreux mouvements politiques qui, après le retrait des 
autorités coloniales, étaient apparus pour représenter les intérêts des groupes ethniques inquiets de leur 
statut politique dans l’Afrique postcoloniale. Cependant, ce fut également une idée ensuite rejetée par 
tous ceux qui exercèrent le pouvoir étatique, qui la jetèrent dans les poubelles de l’histoire. Les évolutions 
récentes indiquent l’idée fédérale, à qui l’on n’avait jamais laissé une chance de se développer et qui fut 
étranglée dès la naissance, revient aujourd’hui sur la scène constitutionnelle de plusieurs pays africains. 
Cet article étudie comment les fédérations africaines ont répondu à la diversité ethnique qui caractérise 
leurs sociétés. Il s’intéresse tout particulièrement à savoir comment la solution d’une autonomie territo-
riale, implicite dans ces fédérations, a aidé à gérer les déﬁ s de la diversité ethnique.
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